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If a transient occurs in a nuclear power plant (NPP), operators will try to protect the NPP by
estimating the kind of abnormality and mitigating it based on recommended procedures.
Similarly, operators take actions based on severe accident management guidelines when
there is the possibility of a severe accident occurrence in an NPP. In any such situation,
information about the occurrence time of severe accident-related events can be very
important to operators to set up severe accident management strategies. Therefore, sup-
port systems that can quickly provide this kind of information will be very useful when
operators try to manage severe accidents. In this research, the occurrence times of several
events that could happen during a severe accident were predicted using support vector
machines with short time variations of plant status variables inputs. For the preliminary
step, the break location and size of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) were identified.
Training and testing data sets were obtained using the MAAP5 code. The results show that
the proposed algorithm can correctly classify the break location of the LOCA and can es-
timate the break size of the LOCA very accurately. In addition, the occurrence times of
severe accident major events were predicted under various severe accident paths, with
reasonable error. With these results, it is expected that it will be possible to apply the
proposed algorithm to real NPPs because the algorithm uses only the early phase data after
the reactor SCRAM, which can be obtained accurately for accident simulations.
Copyright © 2015, Published by Elsevier Korea LLC on behalf of Korean Nuclear Society.1. Introduction
Because both size and complexity of nuclear power plants
(NPPs) are increasing, understanding system problems and
theirmitigation poses significant challenges to operators [1]. If
a transient occurs in an NPP, operators will try to predict
which kind of abnormality has occurred by checking various. Seong).
d under the terms of the
ich permits unrestricted
cited.
sevier Korea LLC on behaplant status variables to protect the NPP from hazardous
situations such as severe accidents. Because the operator's
actions are heavily affected by the instructions written in
the procedures, it is very important for operators to
determine the initiating events. However, due to the many
complicating factors, such as overload of information, high
workload in urgent situations, and the short time availableCreative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://
non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any me-
lf of Korean Nuclear Society.
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wrong decisions, thereby leading to dangerous situations. To
help operators mitigate abnormalities of NPPs properly and
effectively, various operation support systems with artificial
intelligences (AIs) have been developed. For example, AI
techniques were applied to signal validation systems [2e4],
fault diagnosis systems [5,6], and many other support
systems.
Similarly, operators take actions based on severe accident
management guidelines (SAMGs) when there is the possibility
of a severe accident occurrence in an NPP. In such a situation,
information about the occurrence times of severe accident-
related events is very important to operators so that they can
set up severe accident management strategies. Currently,
there are many computer codes that can perform severe ac-
cident-related analyses, but because they require a long time
for both the simulation and the setting of parameters, it is
hard to apply such codes in real-time support systems.
Therefore, support systems that can quickly provide this kind
of information to operators would be very useful when they
try to manage severe accidents.
A previously conducted study that dealt with severe acci-
dent monitoring using several AI techniques [7] successfully
predicted the occurrence times of several severe accident-
related events, including core exposure time, time when
core exit temperature exceeds 1,200F, and reactor vessel
(RV) failure time. However, the study was only conducted for
a case in which no action was taken for mitigation of the
accident. In a real situation, however, operators would take
certain mitigation actions before a severe accident happens,
and these cases also need to be considered. Therefore,
various paths to severe accidents should be considered to
develop more realistic support systems.
To monitor and predict severe accidents, diagnosis of
initiating events should be the first step. In this research, fault
diagnosis using support vector classification (SVC) and sup-
port vector regression (SVR) algorithms that were suggested
by Na et al. [8] were applied with some modifications. The
similarity between this study and the reference comes from
the use of the same algorithms, that is, SVC and SVR.
However, the main difference is that the reference trained
two SVRs for break size estimation in the loss of coolant
accident (LOCA) case, with consideration of the hot leg LOCA
and cold leg LOCA, whereas there were six SVRs for break
size estimation with consideration not only of the hot leg
and cold leg but also of small break (SB), medium break
(MB), and large break (LB) LOCAs. Because of this major
difference, two SVCs were applied to classify the SB, MB, and
LB LOCAs before the detailed break size estimation was
conducted by the trained SVR.
SVC and SVR are included in support vector machines
(SVMs); an SVM is amachine-learning algorithm that has been
successfully used in pattern recognition for cluster analysis
[9]. SVM is applied in many fields of research because of its
high performance in finding global optimums, and high
performance in real applications as well as in artificial
neural networks, which have been applied for a
comparatively long time.
This research also proposes an algorithm based on SVR
that predicts the occurrence time of major events of severeaccidents, such as maximum core temperature exceeding
1,200C, RV failure, and containment (CTMT) failure when
operators fail to mitigate transient. By using event-tree (ET)
analysis, which is widely used in the field of probabilistic risk
assessment, our method is able to classify various paths that
lead to core damage; in addition, severe accident scenario
occurrence times can be predicted for each major path.
Because there are many kinds of initiating events and se-
vere accident paths, considering all of them is very labor
intensive. However, if it is possible to show that these meth-
odologies can predict the occurrence time successfully,
expanding the coverage of the researchwill bemuch easier. In
this regard, only an LOCA transient was considered as an
initiating event and eight severe accident paths under this
LOCA situation were selected as parts of a case study. The
eight severe accident paths contain four severe accident paths
from the SB LOCA, and two paths each from the MB and LB
LOCAs, according to probabilistic priority. In addition, for
further simplification, conservative assumptions (i.e.,
assuming the worst cases) were made for each path. For
example, severe accidents can occur when three or all four
safety injection lines fail to inject water in an LB LOCA con-
dition. In this regard, it is assumed that all four safety injec-
tion lines failed to inject water in the safety injection failure-
related paths, because this is the most serious case.
The proposed algorithms were trained and validated using
data obtained from the MAAP5 (modular accident analysis
program) code simulations. The reference plant for this
research is the Advanced Power Reactor 1400 (APR1400).2. LOCA identifications
Prior to the prediction of occurrence time under LOCA cases, it
is necessary to identify the break location because the
occurrence time differs according to the break location. In this
regard, hot leg LOCA and cold leg LOCA were identified using
SVC in this study. Similarly, because the severe accident path
and occurrence time differ according to the break size, SB
LOCA, MB LOCA, and LB LOCA were classified using multiple
SVCs and SVRs. In addition, the detailed break size was esti-
mated to verify the accuracy of the suggested methodology,
although the results were not used for occurrence time
prediction.
2.1. Data acquisition
To estimate the break location and break size of an LOCA, it is
necessary to collect data sets that indicate how plant status
variables will changewhen an LOCA occurs. Because there are
only a few sets of accident data, data should be obtained from
computational simulations.
Data sets obtained from the simulation were used for
training the SVC and SVR algorithms; properly trained SVC
and SVR algorithms have the capability to classify break lo-
cations and estimate break sizes with the inputs of the plant
status variables. In addition, the trained algorithms are able to
perform such classification or estimation in a short time after
transient occurrence, so that operators can start the mitiga-
tion process as quickly as possible.
Table 1 e List of training data sets and testing data sets.
Training data break size (ft2) Testing data break size (ft2)
0.005, 0.006, 0.007, 0.008, 0.009, 0.010, 0.011, 0.012, 0.013, 0.014,
0.015, 0.016, 0.017, 0.018, 0.019, 0.02, 0.025, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05,
0.06, 0.07,
0.004, 0.0055, 0.0075, 0.0095, 0.0105, 0.0115, 0.0135, 0.0155, 0.0175, 0.0195,
0.0225, 0.035, 0.055, 0.075, 0.095, 0.175, 0.225, 0.325, 0.375,
0.08, 0.09, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20, 0.25, 0.30, 0.35, 0.475, 0.525, 0.575, 0.625, 0.675, 0.725,
0.40, 0.45, 0.50, 0.55, 0.60, 0.65, 0.70, 0.75, 0.775, 0.825, 0.875, 0.925, 1.1
0.80, 0.85, 0.90, 0.95, 1.00
(Cold leg, hot leg each: total 86 data sets) (Cold leg, hot leg each: total 60 data sets)
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quality of the trained algorithm, acquisition of reliable
training data is necessary. In this study, training data were
acquired using the MAAP5 code, developed by Fauske & As-
sociates (Nuclear Applications), located in Illinois, U.S.; this
code is used worldwide for severe accident analysis and has
been provisionally proven as a reliable simulation code. Data
were acquired based on the APR1400 reactor parameters,
developed by Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (Central Research
Institute), located in Daejeon, Korea.
Moreover, Lindholm et al. [10] and Allison [11] performed
research using the MAAP4, MELCOR, and SCDAP/RELAP5
computer codes; both reported that the three listed codes
predicted similar trends in the early phase. Because the
MAAP5 code is an upgraded version of MAAP4 and only early
phase data (from SCRAM to 60 seconds after SCRAM) were
used for the break location and size estimation, data
acquisitionusing theMAAP5code in this research is reasonable.
2.2. Break location identification
2.2.1. Methodology
To identify the break location of an LOCA, SVC was trained to
differentiate between a cold leg LOCA and hot leg LOCA using
13 plant status variables that are observable in main control
rooms. The variables used are as follows: broken side steam
generator (S/G) pressure, level, and temperature; unbroken
side S/G pressure, level, and temperature; pressurizer (PRZ)
pressure and level; core water temperature and level; sump
water level; and CTMT pressure and temperature.
During the training process, time derivatives of each vari-
able were used. In detail, time derivatives from an emergency
shutdown (i.e., SCRAM) to 60 seconds after shutdown were
used.
Eighty-six training data sets consisting of 43 cold leg data
sets and 43 hot leg data sets were used for training of the SVC.
The break sizes of the training data sets varied from 0.005 ft2
to 1.0 ft2. For validation, the trained SVC was applied to 60Fig. 1 e Representation of function by sumtesting data sets consisting of 30 cold leg data sets and 30 hot
leg data sets. The break sizes of the testing data sets varied
from 0.004 ft2 to 1.1 ft2. Because the range of the break size is
broader in the testing data sets, it is possible to check the
extrapolation performance of the trained SVC. Table 1 shows
the break sizes of each training and testing data set.
The parameters for SVC were optimized using the grid-
searchmethod. The radial-basis function (RBF; Fig. 1), which is
generally selected for mapping real-world data, was used as
the “kernel function”. The general shape of the RBF is as
follows:
Kðx; x0Þ ¼ exp
 
 kx; x
0k2
2s2
!
(1)
2.2.2. Results of break location identification
Because the optimized hyperplane of SVC should be able to
classify all the training data sets correctly, the trained SVC
accurately classified the break locations of all 86 training data
sets. The trained SVC was also found to have correctly iden-
tified the break locations of all 60 testing data sets. There were
no classification errors among the total of 146 data sets and,
hence, strict accuracy analysis using type I error (false posi-
tive) and type II error (false negative) could not be conducted.
However, because there were a large number of testing data
sets with various break sizes, it is expected that it will be
possible to perform correct classification of the break location
for most LOCA cases.2.3. Break size estimation
2.3.1. Methodology
LOCAs can be classified according to break size into three
categories, namely, SB LOCA, MB LOCA, and LB LOCA. When
the break size is smaller than 0.02 ft2, it is classified as an SB
LOCA. Break sizes between 0.02 ft2 and 0.5 ft2 are classified as
anMB LOCA, and those bigger than 0.5 ft2 are classified as a LB
LOCA.mation of radial basis function [12].
Fig. 2 e Predicted break size (cold leg loss of coolant
accident).
Fig. 3 e Predicted break size (hot leg loss of coolant
accident).
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LOCA, the classifications of SB LOCA, MB LOCA, and LB LOCA
are helpful for more accurate break size estimation. To iden-
tify these three types of LOCA, two SVCs were trained to
classify the three classes of data set. For the training, time
derivatives of the same 13 plant status variables were used.
After the rough break size estimation of the SVCs, SVRs
were applied to estimate break size more accurately. Because
there are two kinds of break location (cold leg and hot leg) and
three classifications of break size (SB LOCA, MB LOCA, and LB
LOCA), six SVRs were trained for each LOCA scenarios. With
the classification results of the previous SVCs, the corre-
sponding SVR was applied and the break size was estimated.
Because the antecedent SVCs roughly classify the break
location and the break size using the 13 plant status variables,
it is not necessary to conduct regression analysis using all 13
plant status variables. Besides, training the SVRs using all 13
plant status variables takes a very long time. Instead,
considering some important variables, which are the param-
eters that are closely related to break size, such as PRZ pres-
sure, is sufficient to train the SVRs for break size estimation.
As a result, six SVRs were trained only using the time de-
rivatives of the PRZ pressure data.
The same 86 training data sets consisting of 43 cold leg data
sets and 43 hot leg data sets were used for training the SVCs
and SVRs; to validate the trained SVCs and SVRs, the same 60
testing data sets consisting of 30 cold leg data sets and 30 hot
leg data sets were applied.
The parameters were optimized using the grid-search
method, and RBF was used as the kernel function for all SVCs
and SVRs.
The methodology for estimating break location and size
using SVC and SVR was based on the research performed by
Na et al. [8], but with some modifications for break size
estimation and optimization.
2.3.2. Results of break size estimation
Because the optimized hyperplane of SVC should be able to
classify all training data sets correctly, trained SVCs accu-
rately classified all 86 training data sets into SB LOCA, MB
LOCA, and LB LOCA. The trained SVCs also correctly classified
all 60 testing data sets. There were no classification errors
among the total of 146 data sets; therefore, the strict accuracy
analyses that accompany type I errors and type II errors could
not be conducted. However, because there were large
numbers of testing data sets with various break sizes, it is
expected that it will be possible to perform correct classifica-
tion of the break size for most LOCA cases.
Six SVRs were applied to estimate the break size of the
training data sets and the testing data sets using SVR's own
regression functions. Root-mean-square (RMS) estimation
errors for all 86 training data setswere calculated and found to
be 4.02% and 3.66% for the 43 cold leg data sets and the 43 hot
leg data sets, respectively. For the testing data sets, RMS
estimation errors were calculated and found to be 5.70% and
3.92% for the 30 cold leg data sets and the 30 hot leg data sets,
respectively (Figs. 2 and 3). However, break size was not
properly estimated for the data sets that had actual break
sizes of 0.004 ft2 and 1.1 ft2. From these results, it can be seen
that the trained SVRs did not show good results atextrapolation, meaning that the SVRs are valid within the
range of break size from 0.005 ft2 to 1.0 ft2.
Because the previous mean errors were calculated by
including all testing data sets, RMS error will decrease when
the data sets for extreme actual break size (0.004 ft2 and 1.1 ft2)
are neglected. Therefore, the results are sufficient to prove
that the break size estimation performances of the six SVRs
are within acceptable levels. Table 2 shows the RMS error of
break size estimation.3. Severe accident occurrence time
predictions
After identifying the break location and break size of an LOCA,
the occurrence time of important severe accident-related
events, such as maximum core temperature exceeding
1,200C (temperature at which zircaloy starts to rapidly react
Table 2 e RMS and maximum estimation errors of break
size.
Data type RMS error Maximum error
Training data, cold leg 4.02 21.96
Training data, hot leg 3.55 15.20
Testing data, cold leg 5.70 27.50
Testing data, hot leg 3.92 14.71
Data are presented as %.
RMS, root mean square.
Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 7 4e8 478with oxygen), RV failure, and CTMT failure, were predicted
using multiple SVRs. Although ET analyses from the pre-
liminary safety analysis report were referenced to reduce the
number of severe accident paths to be considered, there are
still many paths that lead to severe accidents and it is very
labor intensive to consider all of them. Instead, four severe
accident paths from the SB LOCA and two paths each from the
MB LOCA and the LB LOCA were selected as case studies ac-
cording to probabilistic priority. ET analyses for SB, MB, and LB
LOCA cases are shown in Figs. 4e6, whereas the considered
paths are represented in Table 3. In addition, conservative
assumptions, which mean a consideration of the worst case
for each path, were made in this study. For example, severeFig. 4 e Event-tree analysis for smalaccidents can occur when three or all four safety injection
lines fail to inject water in the LB LOCA condition. In this
regard, it is assumed that all four safety injection lines failed
to inject water in the safety injection failure-related paths,
as this is the most serious case.3.1. Data acquisition
Similar to the cases of break location and size estimation, the
MAAP5 code was used to acquire data sets because the
quantity of real accident data is very low. Even though there is
real accident data, it is hard to use because the accident data
were not acquired under controlled conditions, which means
that the data cannot be included in the domain of interest.
Trends of 13 plant status variables for times when maximum
core temperature exceeded 1,200C, RV failure times, and
CTMT failure times were obtained by simulation. As is docu-
mented in the “Data Acquisition” section, accident simulation
data are accurate in early accident phases; the proposed al-
gorithmwill be applicable for real NPPs because the SVRswere
trained using these data.
Actual time data for validation of the suggested method-
ologywere obtained using the same codewith the assumption
that the data sets from the MAAP5 code simulationsl break loss of coolant accident.
Fig. 5 e Event-tree analysis for medium break loss of coolant accident.
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MAAP was mainly developed for analyses of severe accident
situations of NPPs.
The data sets from simulation were used for the training of
the SVRs for each severe accident path and for the validation
of the proposed algorithm.
3.2. Severe accident occurrence time predictions
3.2.1. General methodology
Because accident progress is different for each severe accident
path, it is obvious that the relation between the plant status
variables and the occurrence times will be different from path
to path. Furthermore, the hot leg LOCA cases and the cold leg
LOCA cases should be considered separately because the
trends of plant status variables in the early phase are different
for these two cases. As a result, 16 SVRs should be trained to
find the relations between the plant status variables and the
occurrence times of one kind of event for each of the selected
paths (as there are three kinds of event, 48 SVRs are required).
However, for SB LOCAs Numbers 21e23, MB LOCA Number 04,
and LB LOCA Number 04 sequences, CTMT failure times were
not considered because two other events were considered tobe more important events. By contrast, for SB LOCA Number
07, MB LOCA Number 02, and LB LOCA Number 02 sequences,
only the CTMT failure time was considered because radioac-
tive material will be released to the environment when CTMT
fails, even when the RV does not fail. Therefore, 26 SVRs were
actually needed to be trained (20 SVRs for maximum core
temperature exceeding 1,200C and RV failure, and 6 SVRs for
CTMT failure). Based on the results of break location and break
size estimation, it was determined which kind of trained SVR
among the 26 SVRs should be applied for occurrence time
prediction.
For the SB LOCA cases, 16 cold leg data sets and 16 hot leg
data sets were used to train the corresponding SVRs. Seven-
teen cold leg data sets and 17 hot leg data sets were used for
the MB LOCA cases; 10 cold leg data sets and 10 hot leg data
sets were used for the LB LOCA cases. Similarly, 10 cold leg
data sets and 10 hot leg data sets were applied as testing data
for each case.
For each case, regression functions that define the re-
lations between the occurrence time and certain plant status
variables were obtained by training the SVR algorithms with
the training data sets. After this, the parameters for each SVR
were optimized using the grid-search method, and RBF was
Fig. 6 e Event-tree analysis for large break loss of coolant accident.
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the selected plant status variables for each severe accident-
related event. Variable selection was conducted with a
consideration of the physical relations.
First, the core temperature can rise to 1,200C only when
the amount of decay heat is larger than the amount of heat
transfer from the primary system to other systems. BecauseTable 3 e Considered sequences in severe accident
occurrence time prediction.
Transient type Considered sequences
(numbering)
SB LOCA Number 07 (#1)
Number 21 (#2)
Number 22 (#3)
Number 23 (#4)
MB LOCA Number 02 (#1)
Number 04 (#2)
LB LOCA Number 02 (#1)
Number 04 (#2)
LB, large break; LOCA, loss of coolant accident; MB, medium break;
SB, small break.the amount of decay heat can be considered a function of
time, it is not related to the 13 variables. Instead, variables
related to heat loss were selected. In the case of a LOCA, the
heat of the primary side can be transferred into the unbrokenTable 4 e Selected variables for each severe accident-
related event for training SVRs.
Event type Selected variables
Time when maximum core
temperature exceeds 1,200C
Unbroken side S/G temperature
CTMT pressure
CTMT temperature
Collapsed water level
RV failure time Unbroken side S/G temperature
CTMT pressure
CTMT temperature
Collapsed water level
CTMT failure time (time when
CTMT pressure exceeds 4 atm)
PRZ pressure
CTMT pressure
CTMT temperature
Collapsed water level
CTMT, containment; PRZ, pressurizer; RV, reactor vessel; SVR,
support vector regression.
Fig. 7 e Prediction results of time when maximum core
temperature exceeds 1,200C (small break Number 2, cold
leg).
Fig. 9 e Prediction results of reactor vessel failure time
(small break Number 2, cold leg).
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temperature was selected to consider the heat transfer to the
secondary side; to consider the heat transfer to the CTMT,
CTMT pressure, CTMT temperature, and collapsed water level
were selected.
Similarly, RV failure can be regarded as an extension of the
core temperature rise. Therefore, the same variables thatwere
selected for the prediction of the time at which the maximum
core temperature will exceed 1,200C were selected.
For CTMT failure, it was assumed that the CTMT will fail if
the CTMT pressure exceeds 4 bars. CTMT pressure rapidly
increases at first when a LOCA happens due to leakage and
vaporization of the primary side coolant; it then increases
almost linearly during the decay heat removal processes.
Because the rise of CTMTpressure is almost entirely caused by
steam, the overall amount of water should be considered. In
this regard, PRZ pressure was selected to consider the amount
of water in the primary side. The CTMT pressure and CTMTFig. 8 e Prediction results of time when maximum core
temperature exceeds 1,200C (small break Number 2, hot
leg).temperature were selected to consider the amount of vapor-
ized steam. Finally, the collapsed water level was selected to
consider the amount of unvaporized leaked water.
3.2.2. Results of severe accident occurrence time prediction
In five cases (SB LOCA Numbers 21e23, MB LOCA Number 04,
and LB LOCA Number 04 sequences), the time at which the
maximum core temperature exceeds 1,200C and the RV fail-
ure time were predicted using the trained SVRs. The results
are shown in Figs. 7e10. The RMS errors are presented in Ta-
bles 5e7. Except for the SB LOCA Number 2 hot leg scenario,
the RMS prediction errors for the time at which themaximum
core temperature exceeds 1,200C and for the RV failure time
were < 10% for all cases.
In three cases (SB LOCA Number 07, MB LOCA Number 02,
and LB LOCA Number 02 sequences), CTMT failure times were
predicted. The results are shown in Fig. 11 and 12. The LB
LOCA Number 1 case was not considered because the break
size did not affect the CTMT failure time significantly. As inFig. 10 e Prediction results of reactor vessel failure time
(small break Number 2, hot leg).
Table 5 e RMS and maximum errors for time when maximum core temperature exceeds 1,200C prediction.
Scenario RMS error
(cold leg)
RMS error
(hot leg)
Maximum error
(cold leg)
Maximum error
(hot leg)
SB LOCA Number 1 d d d d
SB LOCA Number 2 5.35 15.50 28.00 33.98
SB LOCA Number 3 4.40 5.30 14.30 18.14
SB LOCA Number 4 8.41 2.06 33.04 6.03
MB LOCA Number 1 d d d d
MB LOCA Number 2 3.86 3.88 10.30 12.88
LB LOCA Number 1 d d d d
LB LOCA Number 2 8.09 3.48 22.98 8.70
Data are presented as %.
LB, large break; LOCA, loss of coolant accident; MB, medium break; RMS, root mean square; SB, small break.
Table 6 e RMS and maximum errors for reactor vessel failure time prediction.
Scenario RMS error
(cold leg)
RMS error
(hot leg)
Maximum error
(cold leg)
Maximum error
(hot leg)
SB LOCA Number 1 d d d d
SB LOCA Number 2 2.59 12.52 35.07 46.46
SB LOCA Number 3 2.74 3.59 7.16 12.68
SB LOCA Number 4 9.22 3.36 6.55 10.17
MB LOCA Number 1 d d d d
MB LOCA Number 2 1.72 1.51 11.85 6.69
LB LOCA Number 1 d d d d
LB LOCA Number 2 1.65 1.29 4.28 3.22
Data are presented as %.
LB, large break; LOCA, loss of coolant accident; MB, medium break; RMS, root mean square; SB, small break.
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times were < 10% for all four scenarios.
From these results, it can be seen that the predictions of
the time at which the maximum core temperature exceeds
1,200C, the RV failure time, and the CTMT failure time were
accurate for most selected scenarios.4. Discussion
In this research, occurrence times of three kinds of major
severe accident events, including the time at which the
maximum core temperature exceeds 1,200C, RV failure time,Table 7 e RMS and maximum errors for CTMT failure time pre
Scenario RMS error
(cold leg)
RMS er
(hot le
SB LOCA Number 1 3.39 9.69
SB LOCA Number 2 d d
SB LOCA Number 3 d d
SB LOCA Number 4 d d
MB LOCA Number 1 2.01 1.60
MB LOCA Number 2 d d
LB LOCA Number 1 Not considered a Not consid
LB LOCA Number 2 d d
Data are presented as %.
CTMT, containment; LB, large break; LOCA, loss of coolant accident; MB,
a The LB LOCA Number 1 case was not considered because the break sizand CTMT failure time, were predicted using the SVR algo-
rithm. For simplicity, ET analyses of SB LOCA, MB LOCA, and
LB LOCA were referred to and severe accident paths with high
probabilities were selected for case studies; conservative as-
sumptions were made. In addition, for the preliminary step,
SVCs and SVRs were applied to identify the break location and
the break size of the various LOCA scenarios. Integrated
values for all of the 13 kinds of plant status variables from
reactor SCRAM to 60 seconds after SCRAM, or some of these
variables were used for estimation and prediction. The RBF
was used as the kernel function for all SVCs and SVRs; opti-
mization of the SVCs and SVRs was conducted using the grid-
search method. Algorithms for the break location and sizediction.
ror
g)
Maximum error
(cold leg)
Maximum error
(hot leg)
52.43 29.13
d d
d d
d d
10.64 8.51
d d
ered a Not considered a Not considered a
d d
medium break; RMS, root mean square; SB, small break.
e does not significantly affect CTMT failure time.
Fig. 11 e Prediction results of CTMT failure time (small
break Number 1, cold leg).
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[8], were referred to in this research.
The algorithm for break location and size estimation of an
LOCA was successfully applied and the identification results
of the LOCA were found to be reasonable. Break locations of
the training data sets and the testing data sets were success-
fully classified into categories of cold leg LOCA and hot leg
LOCA using the SVC. In addition, using two SVCs, the training
data sets and testing data sets were correctly classified into
categories of SB LOCA, MB LOCA, and LB LOCA according to
the break size. Detailed break size estimation was conducted
using multiple SVRs; the RMS error of estimation was
approximately 3e6%.
The times when maximum core temperature exceeds
1,200C, RV failure time, and CTMT failure time were pre-
dicted with reasonable levels of error. Except for severe cases,
the RMS errors of prediction were < 10% for all three kinds of
events. The possibility of severe accident occurrence time
prediction using SVC and SVR algorithms was verified in this
research. Furthermore, it is expected that it will be possible toFig. 12 e Prediction results of containment failure time
(small break Number 1, hot leg).apply the proposed algorithm to real NPPs because the al-
gorithm uses only the early phase data after the reactor
SCRAM, which can be obtained accurately for accident
simulations.
Further work to lower the prediction error should be con-
ducted. More delicate optimization of the SVC and SVR algo-
rithms by adjusting various parameters should produce better
results than those of the current research. In some studies,
optimization problems have been solved by applying other
algorithms, such as genetic algorithms to search for appro-
priate parameter values [13,14]. If this kind of methodology is
applied for the selection of the appropriate parameter values,
overall estimation quality is expected to be enhanced.
Moreover, to check the performance of the proposed al-
gorithm more precisely, a validation method such as k-fold
cross validation could be applied.
Finally, because the MAAP code was developed mainly to
simulate severe accident scenarios, the use of the RELAP or
MARS code for break location and size estimation, instead of
the MAAP code, could lead to more accurate results, even
though the performance of the MAAP code is almost identical
to those other codes for short-time simulation. Therefore, it
will be very meaningful to conduct research that compares
results that can be obtained using these three, or even more,
codes.Conflicts of interest
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